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1. Introduction
About the  
McKell Institute 
The McKell Institute is an independent, not-for-profit, public 
policy institute dedicated to developing practical policy ideas and 
contributing to public debate. The McKell Institute takes its name 
from New South Wales’ wartime Premier and Governor–General of 
Australia, William McKell.
William McKell made a powerful contribution to both New South Wales and Australian 
society through significant social, economic and environmental reforms
For more information phone (02) 9113 0944  
or visit www.mckellinstitute.org.au
The opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily  
represent the views of the McKell Institute’s members, affiliates,  
individual board members or research committee members.  
Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
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Background 
The authors of this paper have utilised a range of publicly available information and 
our own analysis in compiling this paper, along with information provided from various 
industry participants.
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On average, every 5 out of 100 workers each year 
are afflicted with an injury or illness obtained in the 
workplace.
According to Safe Work Australia 184 Australians lost 
their lives at work in 2014. 
The need for an effective and efficient workers’ 
compensation scheme is clear; however neither the 
current nor the proposed systems effectively address 
the concerns of all stakeholders. 
This report analyses the proposed Safety, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill 2014 (Cth)  
(SRC Bill), and, for a number of key reasons, argues 
that the bill should be rejected.
The bill will clearly disadvantage working Australians, 
small business and taxpayers. 
Workers will be disadvantaged as the SRC Bill 
provides less entitlements, has the least effective 
regulator and the lengthiest and most cumbersome 
dispute resolution process of all the current workers’ 
compensation schemes in Australia. 
The majority of businesses will also be disadvantaged 
under the SRC Bill as only multi-state employers 
can move to the new scheme. This means that 
the premium pool of the current state and territory 
schemes with be dramatically reduced as the larger 
businesses exit the scheme leading to an increase in 
premiums for the remaining small and medium-sized 
businesses and for those large organisations that 
only operate within one state.
Taxpayers also stand to lose from the new scheme 
as common law access will be limited, thereby 
shifting compensation claim costs from employers 
to taxpayers. Medicare, the NDIS and the welfare 
system all stand to absorb greater pressure due to 
lessor entitlements to injured workers.
Additionally, the premise that multi-state businesses 
stand to gain significantly from the introduction of 
the SRC Bill is precarious. The claim is based solely 
on anecdotal evidence provided by multi-state 
businesses themselves, and not from independent 
actuarial analysis. 
Finally, under the proposed scheme, Comcare would 
potentially be responsible for 67 times its current 
workload capacity. Already Comcare conducts 
far fewer workplace interventions and visits, and 
its investigators issue far fewer improvement and 
prohibition notices than their State colleagues, 
however the proposed bill will see as many as 1959 
businesses move to Comcare’s self-insurance 
scheme. This will place much higher pressure on the 
national regulator, as well as placing the lives and 
wellbeing of many more workers at a higher risk. 
Both the current system and the proposed SRC 
Bill have serious shortcomings. Australia requires 
a thorough and bipartisan investigation into a 
new nationally consistent workers’ compensation 
framework that serves the interests of all stakeholders 
and Australians. 
The McKell Institute supports a national scheme, but 
not that serves only a very small minority of Australian 
businesses. Instead, we support one that is fair to 
workers and small business. We accept that the 
current regulatory framework should be streamlined, 
but insist that it should be done through a more 
balanced and rigorous process. 
Workplace injuries cost Australia an estimated $60.6 billion,  
or 4.8% of GDP every year. 
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But the devastation wreaked by unsafe workplaces 
does not stop there. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics’ ‘Work Related Injury Survey’ shows that 
50 out of every 1000 workers experience an injury 
or illness in the workplace each year.2
Workers’ compensation schemes aim to mitigate 
the adverse consequences arising from workplace 
injury and death. These schemes are based around 
two fundamental tenets: that workers injured during 
the course of their employment should receive fair 
compensation and that those workers should be 
provided with rehabilitation services so as to enable 
them to return to work as soon as possible. 
The attainment of these principles is in the 
interests of all stakeholders – workers, businesses 
and the community at large. With the annual 
cost of workplace injury estimated to be $60.6 
billion dollars, representing 4.8% of annual 
GDP, the importance of efficient and effective 
workers’ compensation schemes cannot be 
underestimated.3
This report examines the Federal Government’s 
attempt to reform the workers’ compensation 
landscape via the Safety, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 
(Cth) (‘the SRC Bill’). This Bill seeks to significantly 
All Australian workers and their families expect the workplace to be a safe place 
and that workers can return home without injury or accident. Unfortunately, all 
too often, the opposite is true. Last year there were 184 fatalities and in the first 
47 days of 2015, 20 workers have died due to an injury incurred at work.1
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expand the national workers’ compensation 
scheme by permitting multi-state employers to 
obtain a self-insurance licence. This represents a 
radical departure from the status quo which sees 
the vast majority of Australian employers regulated 
through existing state and territory schemes.
For a number of key reasons the SRC Bill should 
be rejected. First and foremost, the Bill fails the 
basic test of ‘benefit to stakeholders’. 
Workers will be disadvantaged by the expansion of 
the national scheme given that it provides the least 
entitlements, has the least effective regulator, and 
the lengthiest dispute resolution process of all the 
workers’ compensation jurisdictions in Australia. 
The vast majority of businesses will be 
disadvantaged under the Bill as only multi-state 
employers can move to the national scheme, 
necessarily reducing the premium pool of the state 
and territory schemes. This will increase premiums 
for the small and medium sized businesses 
remaining in those schemes and in fact, threatens 
the ongoing viability of those schemes. 
The Bill also fails to pass the public interest test. 
It shifts the cost of workers’ compensation claims 
from employers to the public purse as common 
law access is limited, and greater onus will fall on 
the social security system and Medicare to address 
workers’ costs arising from work-related injuries.
Not only does this report find that this Bill will be to 
the detriment of the vast majority of stakeholders, 
but that the evidential basis for its introduction is 
unsound. The only stakeholders alleged to benefit 
from the SRC Bill are multi-state businesses, but 
even there, this benefit has only been quantified 
through anecdotal evidence provided by these 
same businesses. It is concerning that no 
independent actuarial analysis has been conducted 
to support this contention. 
It is the conclusion of this report that the SRC Bill 
represents a hasty, ad-hoc attempt to create a 
national workers’ compensation system, and that 
the Bill should be rejected.
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Key findings 
1. There is no compelling evidence that the 
vast majority of Australian businesses would 
experience cost savings under the Safety, 
Rehabilitation Compensation Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2014 (Cth).
2. Given the potential risks arising from self-
insurance for workers and for the economy in 
the event of an employer’s financial collapse, 
the Comcare scheme should not be expanded 
until it is more robustly regulated. 
3. Regulatory measures recommended in the 
Taylor Fry report,4 the Hanks report5 and the 
Hawke report6 should be adopted to ensure 
that self-insurers meet strict prudential and 
other requirements. 
4. Self-insurance is a privilege not a right. Only 
employers with a strong financial position and a 
superior approach to all aspects of work health 
and safety should be eligible for self-insurance.
5. The SRC Bill is a retrograde step that adopts 
a lowest common denominator approach to 
workers’ compensation. Instead of adopting the 
best aspects of the state and territory workers’ 
compensation schemes, the Bill deregulates the 
national scheme and places increased pressure 
on the vast majority of businesses and reduces 
workers’ entitlements and rights in the event of 
a death or injury.
This report recommends that 
1. The SRC Bill be rejected.
2. The Federal Government instead pursue 
a bipartisan and balanced approach to 
developing a nationally consistent framework for 
workers’ compensation. 
3. An independent actuarial analysis be 
undertaken to identify the potential financial 
impact from the development of a national 
workers’ compensation system.
4. The independent actuarial review should 
consider the impact upon businesses that 
remain operating in a state or territory 
jurisdiction and the impact upon multi-state 
businesses that are eligible to move into the 
national workers’ compensation scheme.
5. There should be an audit of the best practices 
in the state and federal workers compensation 
and occupational health and safety system as 
a means of determining national best practice 
benchmarks for use in a national system. 
6. That national scheme’s regulator, Comcare, 
should be operating on par with, or better 
than, the state and territory regulators 
before an expansion of the national workers’ 
compensation scheme be considered.
7. The Comcare inspectorate should be more 
effectively resourced with improved recruitment 
and training of its personnel. 
8. The Comcare inspectorate should be 
restructured so as to better address the needs 
of the regions and high-risk industries. 
9. Statutory timelines should be introduced 
Recommendations  
and Key Findings
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into the national workers’ compensation 
scheme and the dispute resolution process, 
currently highly labyrinth, requires immediate 
simplification. The Comcare scheme should 
introduce provisional liability and employers 
should bear costs for the resolution of disputes 
prior to external review.
It is outside the scope of this project to 
comprehensively recommend how a national 
workers’ compensation system should be 
designed. However the following points are made 
in relation to the development of a national workers’ 
compensation system.
1. Although the Taylor Fry report, the Hanks 
report and the Hawke report advocate 
the expansion of the national scheme, all 
three reports qualify this with a need to 
significantly increase regulation of self-
insurers and to improve the performance of 
the scheme regulator, Comcare. It is highly 
imprudent for the SRC Bill to expand the 
national scheme without addressing these 
qualifications.
 The SRC Bill does not mandate that only 
employers who can demonstrate a superior 
approach in all areas of injury prevention, claims 
management and occupational health and 
safety standards are eligible for self-insurance. 
Instead, the SRC Bill only requires that an 
employer be operating in more than one state. 
The Taylor Fry report identifies a need for 
‘stringent rules to ensure that potential self-
insurers have best practice OHS arrangements, 
a sound financial base and the ability to manage 
the self-insurance process.’7 
 When compared with its state and territory 
counterparts, the national scheme regulator 
does not operate as efficiently or effectively. 
Comcare has conducted far fewer workplace 
interventions and proactive and reactive 
workplace visits. Its investigators have issued 
far fewer improvement and prohibition notices 
and the agency is less experienced in launching 
legal proceedings.
 There is significant potential for self-insurance to 
be abused by unscrupulous employers. These 
employers may seek to use self-insurance as 
a way of avoiding paying premiums but may 
not be genuinely oriented to assisting injured 
workers to return to work. Due to resourcing 
and structural constraints, Comcare is not 
adequately equipped to monitor performance 
or hold self-insurers to account on a national 
scale if the self-insurer does not meet injury 
management and return to work obligations. 
Because of this, an expansion of the Comcare 
scheme should not occur at the present time.
2. Expanding the Comcare scheme is likely 
to drive up premiums for businesses that 
remain in the state and territory workers’ 
compensation schemes.
 All state and territory governments opposed 
the SRC Bill’s model for expanding the national 
workers’ compensation scheme. These 
governments are concerned, quite rightly, that 
an expansion in the national scheme will reduce 
the premium pool in the state and territory 
jurisdictions. 
 Although the Federal Government maintains 
that only a small number of businesses will 
move to the Comcare scheme and thus the 
Bill’s impact will be low on the viability of the 
state and territory schemes, this projection 
seems fairly dubious given that the presence 
of a less effective scheme regulator, lower 
premiums and less red tape ensuing from a 
single national scheme is likely to attract the 
vast majority of multi-state employers that 
are eligible to move across to the Comcare 
scheme. 
 Put simply, a cost/benefit analysis is likely to 
attract multi-state employers on these grounds 
alone. This leaves behind a significant number 
of small and medium businesses (and some 
large businesses that operate within the 
confines of a single state) that are likely to incur 
higher premiums as a result. 
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 The Productivity Commission 
acknowledged that the expansion of the 
Comcare scheme, in the manner envisaged 
by the SRC Bill, was likely to produce 
serious adverse consequences for the other 
schemes. Its final report stated:
“The opening up of a national 
scheme to all corporate 
employers would have 
potentially significant impacts 
on the existing State and 
Territory scheme…Some of 
the smaller schemes may 
ultimately become more 
unviable on a stand-alone 
basis if a significant number 
of employers switch to the 
national scheme.”8
3. The SRC Bill’s projected cost savings 
for multi-state businesses and for the 
economy as a whole are predicated on 
an unsound evidential basis.
 The primary arguments for the Bill are 
reliant on the submissions of multi-state 
businesses, the very interest group 
lobbying the hardest for the expansion 
of the Comcare scheme. It is clear that 
independent actuarial analysis needs to 
be done as to the cost savings likely to be 
incurred by multi-state businesses and the 
impact that an expansion of the Comcare 
scheme will have on businesses remaining 
the state and territory jurisdictions. Without 
this analysis, the case for moving to expand 
the Comcare scheme is highly suspect. 
 In fact, we submit that the Bill is likely to 
increase the pressures on the national 
economy as the financial burden for 
workplace injuries and deaths shifts from 
employers in the national scheme, to the 
social security system and Medicare.
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Workers’ compensation schemes operate to reduce 
this cost by intervening early in the life cycle of injury 
and seeking to maximise the opportunity for a worker 
to return to employment.
The importance of workers’ compensation 
schemes is often overlooked as workers’ 
compensation is only accessed by a relatively small 
number of injured workers each year. Nonetheless, 
the magnitude of workers’ compensation in terms 
of financial impact and protection for injured 
workers renders it an issue of high significance. 
All Australian employers are required to obtain 
workers’ compensation insurance and this is 
administered through governments and private 
insurers. Over and above the issue of financial 
management, there is the tremendous dislocation 
and physical and mental consequences associated 
with workplace death and/or accident. There is 
also a strong expectation within the Australian 
community that workers have a fundamental right 
to be safe at work, and to be compensated fairly 
in the event of a workplace death or injury. Thus, 
although workers’ compensation rarely features 
as a matter of high political importance, it is 
nevertheless of critical policy concern.
In Australia, originating in 1974 at the initiative of 
the Whitlam Labor Government, there have been 
various attempts to develop greater consistency 
between state, territory and Commonwealth 
workers’ compensation systems so as to reduce 
compliance costs and inequities between systems. 
The most recent legislative effort to move towards 
a national workers’ compensation system is the 
Safety, Rehabilitation Compensation Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2014 (Cth) (‘The SRC Bill’). The 
primary aim of the SRC Bill is to expand access to 
self-insurance within the federal system by enticing 
previous state insured employers into the existing 
federal system.
Whilst, in principle, the objective of working towards 
a nationally consistent regulatory framework for 
workers’ compensation is desirable, this report 
argues that there needs to be practical effective 
harmonisation within a realistic timeframe. The SRC 
Bill does not achieve this, and will instead create a 
regulatory vacuum within the Comcare scheme as 
it places too low a burden for self-insurance.10 
The SRC Bill represents a hasty and ad hoc 
response to the demands of a small group of 
large and influential corporations for a national 
workers’ compensation scheme. It does not 
effectively balance the competing interests of all the 
participants involved in the various state and federal 
systems. It reduces the rights and entitlements of 
workers and is likely to increase premiums for small 
and medium sized businesses that remain in the 
state and territory systems. 
Although a number of reviews have 
recommended the development of a national 
workers’ compensation scheme,11 this report 
argues that the SRC Bill is not an appropriate 
vehicle for achieving this legitimate policy goal. 
If a move to a national workers’ compensation 
scheme is to occur, a more considered and 
consensual approach needs to be taken by 
the federal government. If the national workers’ 
compensation scheme is to be expanded to permit 
self-insurance for a greater number of employers, 
the blueprint for this process is for an employer 
applying for a self-insurance license to demonstrate 
a strong financial base and superior performance in 
all areas of injury prevention, claims management 
Introduction
The costs arising from workplace injury are a significant impost on the 
Australian economy. The total economic cost of work-related injuries and illness 
is estimated to be $60.6 billion dollars, representing 4.8% of annual GDP.9
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and work health and safety standards. Self-
insurance needs to be rigorously regulated to 
ensure that an employer demonstrates an ongoing 
commitment and investment in this area. 
The national regulator, Comcare, also needs to 
be operating at best practice levels and must be 
effectively resourced in order to cope with the 
expansion of its role. The impact on state systems 
should also be carefully considered given that an 
expansion of the Comcare system will necessarily 
reduce the premium pool of the state systems and 
may therefore increase the premiums of small and 
medium sized businesses.
The Bill represents a missed opportunity to improve 
the Comcare scheme. It broadens access to the 
scheme but fails to ensure that Comcare will be 
able to cope with this expansion or to require 
that Comcare develop a more effective approach 
to managing workers’ compensation. In effect, 
the enticement for employers to leave the 
state-based systems is the promise of lower 
premiums which inevitably come at the 
expense of workers’ entitlements. In short, the 
Bill creates a regulatory vacuum that puts both 
workers and employers at risk.
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The Commonwealth Government’s workers’ 
compensation scheme has a less lengthy pedigree. 
A national scheme was established under the 
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
1988 (Cth) to provide workers’ compensation and 
rehabilitation coverage for Commonwealth and 
ACT Government employees. In 1992, this Act 
was amended to enable certain categories of non-
Commonwealth corporations to self-insure under 
the Comcare scheme, with the consequence that 
their workers ’ compensation arrangements were 
no longer subject to state or territory law. 
The first non-Commonwealth corporation to seek 
a self-insurance licence was Optus12 and there 
are currently 29 corporations with self-insurance 
licences within the Comcare scheme.13 To be 
declared eligible for self-insurance a corporation 
must either be a ‘former Commonwealth authority’ 
or pass a ‘competition test’ which requires that 
they be conducting business in competition with 
a Commonwealth authority, or with a corporation 
that was previously a Commonwealth authority. 
The rationale for the introduction of self-insurance 
arrangements for non-Commonwealth corporations 
was to provide competitive neutrality for those 
corporations competing in the marketplace with 
Commonwealth-owned, or formerly owned, 
businesses to ensure that the Commonwealth did 
not have an unfair advantage.
Further legislative changes in 2006 enabled private 
corporations which were licensed to self-insure 
under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Act 1988 (Cth) also to be covered by the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth), 
rather than state and territory occupational health 
and safety legislation.14 This arrangement, initiated 
by the Howard Coalition Government ‘allowed the 
most financially viable employers to migrate out of 
the state schemes, without reference to the state 
schemes, or to the interests of their employees.’15
The Rudd Labor Government imposed a 
moratorium in December 2007 preventing further 
non-Commonwealth corporations from self-insuring 
under Comcare. The purpose of the moratorium 
was ‘to enable the Government to examine 
whether the Comcare scheme provides workers 
with access to appropriate workplace safety and 
compensation arrangements.’16 
The moratorium was lifted by the Abbott Coalition 
Government on 2 December 2013 on the grounds 
that it would ‘help remove unnecessary barriers 
for the benefit of workers and businesses while 
achieving a more flexible and productive workplace 
relations system.’17
In March 2014 the Abbott Coalition Government 
introduced into federal parliament the SRC 
Bill. It has been a highly controversial piece of 
legislation and contains a number of significant 
reform measures. It is to its content and these 
controversies that we now turn.
The Origins of Workers’ 
Compensation Schemes  
in Australia
Australia’s federal system of government has meant that the development of 
workers’ compensation schemes has traditionally been the purview of state and 
territory governments. These schemes have established systems and procedures 
for monitoring work health and safety standards, managing insurance claims and 
where possible, returning rehabilitated employees to the workplace. 
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The Safety, Rehabilitation 
Compensation Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2014 (Cth) 
Although its provisions are varied, the primary task of the SRC Bill is to enable 
large corporations operating in more than one state to move into the Comcare 
scheme.18 The SRC Bill replaces ‘the competition test’ with ‘the national employer 
test’ stipulating that to be eligible for self-insurance, a corporation must have 
employees in more than one state or territory.19 
The SRC Bill also enables corporations which are 
related bodies corporate within the meaning of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to obtain a ‘group 
licence’ to self-insure under the Comcare scheme20 
and removes the requirement that corporations 
applying for self-insurance must first obtain a 
ministerial declaration.21 
The SRC Bill also extends the coverage of the Work 
Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) to all corporations 
that obtain a licence to self-insure under Comcare, 
thereby excluding the operation of state or territory 
work health and safety laws.22 Cumulatively, these 
measures seek to ensure that licence-holders 
operate within an integrated regulatory environment 
in relation to compensation, rehabilitation and 
prevention of work related injury. 
The SRC Bill has clearly been designed with the 
needs of large, multi-state employers in mind. The 
Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum suggests that 
‘these changes will assist in reducing unnecessary 
and ineffective red tape for business by broadening 
the range of corporations that can seek to enter 
the Comcare scheme and allowing multi-state 
employers to reduce their compliance costs for 
maintaining workers’ compensation coverage.’23 
However, the positive impact of the SRC Bill is 
not intended to be limited to large, multi-state 
employers but to flow on to the national economy 
as a whole. In the second reading speech 
introducing the SRC Bill into parliament, Minister 
for Education and Training Christopher Pyne 
stated, ‘It is anticipated that the reduction in red 
tape and significant savings that could be realised 
for business could be spent on creating jobs and 
reinvesting in the economy.’24 
The remainder of this report seeks to examine the 
Government’s contentions in relation to the SRC 
Bill, in particular, the alleged benefits in terms of 
business efficiency, job creation and economic 
prosperity. 
This report also considers what the unintended 
consequences of the Bill are for workers, 
businesses and the economy as a whole. Evidence 
will be presented to reveal that for each of 
these stakeholders the impact of the SRC Bill is 
overwhelmingly negative.
Thus, while there is a superficial attraction 
to the SRC Bill as it creates an integrated 
regulatory environment for multi-state 
employers, there are many aspects of 
the Bill, which, beyond that superficial 
observation, make it clear that this is a 
deeply retrograde step. 
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The data for this part of the report is taken from 
a combination of regulator data and a number of 
independent reviews commissioned by previous 
Governments into the Comcare scheme. As will 
be shown in this section, self-insurance is not an 
appropriate workers’ compensation model for the 
vast majority of employers. This is because self-
insurance is a privilege, not a right. Only large 
employers possessing significant financial 
resources and, most importantly, which can 
demonstrate a best practice approach to all 
aspects of work health and safety should be 
eligible for self-insurance. 
Moreover, the national scheme’s regulator, 
Comcare, is not as efficient or effective as 
regulators in the state and territory jurisdictions. 
Comcare does not have a best practice approach 
in terms of enforcement policy, nor the requisite 
operational capacity to ensure self-insurers provide 
safe workplaces with exemplary return to work 
practices. 
Further, the SRC Bill does not reform Comcare’s 
operational capacity and performance to address 
its current inadequacies or the increased pressure 
upon its resources which will result from the entry 
of more self-insurers into the national scheme. 
We now turn to a more thorough examination of 
these two key issues arising from the SRC Bill.
SELF-INSURANCE
Background
The SRC Bill widens the pool of employers eligible 
for self-insurance. It enables an employer with 
employees in more than one state to apply for 
a self-insurance licence, which exempts them 
from paying premiums in those states where it 
is currently registered and allows an employer 
to be responsible for managing its own workers’ 
compensation claims. Self-insurers are still required 
to pay a levy that is a fair contribution towards the 
overheads of administering the Comcare scheme 
and they have to reapply to self-insure after a 
period of time.
Whilst the states and territories have enabled 
certain employers to self-insure for a number of 
years, the expansion of Comcare’s self-insurance 
scheme via the SRC Bill enables a multi-state 
employer to be subject to one single self-insurance 
regulator for its entire staff. Large, multi-state 
employers argue that this will reduce the extra 
compliance costs that unnecessarily result from 
their operating across a number of jurisdictions.
The chief attraction of self-insurance for an employer 
is that they can self-manage the claims management 
and rehabilitation of their injured workers and take 
responsibility for meeting all of their claim liabilities. 
This means that if an employer has a best practice 
Section One: 
Issues Arising from  
the SRC Bill
In this first section, this report examines two key issues arising from the SRC Bill. 
The first is to do with the proposed expansion of the Comcare scheme to widen 
the number of employers eligible for self-insurance.25 The second issue is whether 
the scheme regulator, Comcare, can cope with this expansion of the national 
workers’ compensation scheme. 
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approach to managing work health and safety, there 
are likely to be fewer claims and that a self-insurer 
will not be paying higher premiums merely because 
of the poor work health and safety practices of other 
employers in the scheme. 
Under the present system, employers that meet 
‘the competition test’ can seek a ministerial 
declaration of their eligibility for self-insurance. Once 
this declaration is made, an employer can apply 
to the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Commission (‘SRCC’) for a self-insurance licence. 
Comcare carries out the evaluation of licence 
applications on behalf of the SRCC.26 To date, 
Comcare has never rejected a self-insurance 
licence application.
Self-insurers are required to comply with the SRC 
Act and the Commonwealth WHS Act relating 
to occupational health and safety matters. Self-
insurers are subject to audits, OHS investigations 
and other evaluations and must meet financial, 
prudential and performance reporting requirements 
as part of their licence conditions. The performance 
standards of a licence require self-insurers to 
develop and implement effective management 
systems for prevention, rehabilitation and claims 
management, and to work towards the attainment 
of outcome-based performance goals. The SRCC 
receives reports on licensee performance against 
a number of key performance indicators and 
associated performance targets. The indicators 
cover prevention, rehabilitation, claims management 
and scheme administration. Self-insurers must also 
meet various prudential requirements which include 
obtaining a yearly actuarial assessment of current 
and projected workers’ compensation liabilities and 
a bank guarantee to cover 95% of their outstanding 
liabilities.27
The SRCC uses its ‘Licensee Improvement 
Program’ to evaluate licensees, which is predicated 
upon a three-tier model according to the level 
of risk associated with the self-insurer. Each 
self-insurer is given a tier ranking for each of its 
prevention, rehabilitation and claims management 
functions. First tier self-insurers have the highest 
premiums and are audited by Comcare each year, 
whereas third tier self-insurers have the lowest 
premiums and are only audited in the last year of 
their licence.28 
Having briefly explained how self-insurance presently 
works, there are a number of key concerns with the 
proposed expansion of Comcare’s self-insurance 
scheme under the SRC Bill.
Problems arising from the  
self-insurance provisions  
in the SRC Bill
The first and most concerning aspect of the 
SRC Bill is the absence of a robust regulatory 
framework for managing self-insurers. Although 
the Government has suggested that the SRC 
Bill merely implements the recommendations of 
previous reviews,29 in fact the SRC Bill represents 
the selective cherry picking of recommendations 
arising from previous reviews.30 
With regards to self-insurance, the Taylor Fry report, 
the Hawke report and the Hanks report each 
stipulate that an expansion of the self-insurance 
system needs to be accompanied by increased 
regulation of self-insurers and a substantial increase 
in Comcare’s regulatory capacity. The SRC Bill 
makes no attempt to achieve this. 
For example, the Taylor Fry report states:
It is unclear whether, even 
accounting for recent increases in 
staff, Comcare has the resources 
to carry out the types of proactive 
enforcement regimes adopted 
by state jurisdictions, especially 
in geographically demanding 
regions like Western Australia. 
This matter requires careful 
review before any expansion in 
Comcare coverage is considered. 
Unless effective resourcing 
(including deployment) moves 
in tandem with coverage, a 
regulatory vacuum is inevitable.31
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It is estimated that there will be 1959 businesses that are eligible to apply for self-insurance 
if ‘the national test’ replaces ‘the competition test’.32 Given that Comcare only currently 
regulates 29 self-insurers, this potentially represents a massive expansion of the national 
scheme of 67 times its present capacity.33 This is both alarming and potentially dangerous 
given the Taylor Fry report’s clear declaration that Comcare would be unable to cope with 
this. This would strain Comcare’s capacity to effectively evaluate licence applications and 
monitor the ongoing performance of self-insurers.
Similarly, the Hawke report suggests that the SRCC establish a robust regulatory 
framework to monitor the claims management performance of Comcare as a determining 
authority, using relevant aspects of the arrangements currently in place for self-insurers.34 
The Hanks report recommends that a new paragraph be inserted in s 89B giving the 
SRCC regulatory oversight over determining Comcare’s claims management functions 
and authority to develop and implement a regulatory and performance monitoring 
framework for that purpose.35
Unfortunately, the SRC Bill adopts the deregulatory proposals of the Taylor Fry 
report, the Hanks report and the Hawke report without committing to their 
recommendations requiring that an expansion of the self-insurance scheme be 
accompanied by an increase in regulation. 
This is a highly dangerous approach given the potential for an influx of new inexperienced self-
insurers into the Comcare scheme. There is a likelihood that this approach will delay access 
to medical and rehabilitation payments and delay payments to injured employees. This will 
result in financial hardship and a shift of the cost of workplace injuries to the injured workers, 
their families and to the public health and welfare system. The potential that self-insurers may 
collapse under the financial strain of claims management also needs to be addressed.36 
A related issue concerns the SRC Bill’s proposal to introduce group licences. The SRC 
Bill enables corporations which are related bodies corporate within the meaning of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to obtain a ‘group licence’ to self-insure under Comcare. This 
reform has been previously recommended by both the Taylor Fry report37 and the Hawke 
report38 as minimising the regulatory burden upon employers by reducing administrative 
costs for scheme participation. 
Nonetheless, both reviews suggested that the introduction of group licences be 
appropriately regulated so that eligible corporations meet prudential and other 
requirements. The provision in the SRC Bill introducing group licences does not address 
this. Instead, the bill would create a regulatory environment under which there 
is significant potential for the group licence provision to be open to abuse by 
unscrupulous employers attracted by the lower premiums in the Comcare scheme and 
the presence of a less effective scheme regulator. 
By way of comparison, comparable state group licensees possess more stringent 
requirements and some require a certain minimum number of employees. For example in 
NSW only wholly owned subsidiary companies are to be included in the group licence and in 
order to be eligible for self-insurance there must be a minimum of 500 employees in NSW.39 
This ensures that small employers, who do not have the regulatory and financial capacity for 
self-insurance, cannot obtain a group licence merely because they allege a relationship to a 
large corporation.
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KEY FINDINGS
It is not necessary that self-insurance arrangements 
under the Comcare scheme be abolished but 
rather that a more balanced and rigorous regulatory 
approach be adopted. ‘The competition test’ is a 
historical anachronism with no clear defensible policy 
basis. It draws an arbitrary line in the sand in terms 
of which businesses are eligible for self-insurance 
and does not address the key issue of performance, 
efficiency and health and safety outcomes. Self-
insurance is to some extent a misnomer because 
the employer in fact is not insured and must have 
sufficient resources to pay all claims. This is why 
the state jurisdictions put in place imposing financial 
constraints on licence holders. It should be noted 
that the collapse of a self-insurer will in most cases 
put the general or uninsured funds of the state or 
federal schemes at risk.
Self-insurance is a privilege not a right. This is 
because only employers who can demonstrate a 
superior approach in all areas of injury prevention, 
claims management and occupational health 
and safety standards should be eligible for self-
insurance. The Taylor report identifies a need for 
‘stringent rules to ensure that potential self-insurers 
have best practice OHS arrangements, a sound 
financial base and the ability to manage the self-
insurance process.’40 
Whilst ‘the competition test’ should be 
reconsidered, its replacement with ‘the 
national employer test’ is a retrograde step 
that does not incorporate the necessary 
safeguards to ensure that workers, 
businesses and the national economy are 
sufficiently protected.
The introduction of group licences, whilst a 
worthwhile step for reducing the regulatory burden 
on large, multi-state employers, needs to be 
accompanied by regulation to ensure employers do 
not exploit group licences as a means of evading 
stricter workers’ compensation schemes at the 
state and territory level. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
We now identify a number of key concrete 
proposals for how self-insurance under the 
Comcare scheme could be reformed to achieve 
a better balance between efficiency gains for 
employers and protection of health and safety 
rights for employees.
1. ‘The competition test’ should be replaced 
by a strong ‘national employer test’. This 
test should stipulate a minimum number of 
employees in each state so that it is a proper 
test of an employer’s multi-state operations. 
Only genuinely large, multi-state corporations 
should be eligible for self-insurance. It should 
also stipulate compliance with best practice in 
claims management and occupational health 
and safety. 
2. Self-insurers should be required to share with 
scheme contributing employers those systems 
and programs that allow them to achieve a 
superior performance. This recognises that 
the abolition of workplace injuries and deaths 
is in everyone’s interests and allows for the 
accumulation of communal knowledge and 
experience of best practice management.
3. Employee/worker interests should be taken 
into account in the registration of an employer 
as a self-insurer. As the primary beneficiaries 
under any workers’ compensation system and 
therefore of a self-insurance scheme, workers 
should be able to access an independent body 
that can review an employer’s self-insurance 
status. 
4. Employers seeking to become or to remain self-
insurers must be able to demonstrate that the 
majority of their employees generally favour this 
option. The Taylor Fry report identifies a strong 
business case for involving workers in these 
types of decisions because ‘a growing body of 
evidence demonstrates the positive benefits of 
worker participation in OHS …in workplaces 
where structures of worker representation 
are in. This evidence comes from many 
countries, including those where participatory 
mechanisms are not mandated by legislation.’41
5. The approval process for self-insurance 
licences should be tightened so that only 
employers with a best practice approach in all 
areas of injury prevention, claims management 
and occupational health and safety standards 
should be eligible. 
6. Self-insurers should be required to demonstrate 
that their employees are not worse off because 
of an employer’s move to a self-insurance 
scheme when compared with their previous 
regulatory arrangements. 
7. Comcare should have clear criteria for rejecting 
licence applications and the process should 
include giving notice to those workers affected 
by the issuing of a license and a period allowed 
for those affected to make submissions to 
Comcare.
8. The SRCC’s regulatory role should be 
strengthened to ensure its effective monitoring 
of licence-holders ongoing performance.
9. The introduction of group licences should 
mandate that all employers within the group 
possess a minimum number of employees and 
meet certain prudential requirements. 
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The SRC Bill seeks to significantly expand the 
national workers’ compensation scheme, which 
will necessarily increase the pressures on Comcare 
as the scheme regulator. A key concern is that 
Comcare is already operating below the 
performance level of regulators in the state 
and territory jurisdictions and an expansion of 
Comcare’s role will worsen this. An expansion 
in the national scheme should only be considered 
when Comcare is operating more effectively than 
its state and territory counterparts and when a 
clear commitment has been made to substantially 
increase its resources.
In this section we examine evidence and data 
revealing a number of areas where Comcare’s 
operational capacity and performance needs to be 
improved. The material relied upon in this section 
is taken from a combination of regulator data 
and annual reports from the scheme regulators 
in the national system and each of the states and 
territories. 
As will be shown below, compared to every 
other state and territory jurisdiction and Australia 
as a whole, Comcare has conducted far fewer 
workplace interventions and proactive and reactive 
workplace visits. Its investigators have issued far 
fewer improvement and prohibition notices and the 
agency has launched far fewer legal proceedings. 
This divergence in inspection and enforcement 
activity is not accounted by jurisdiction size since it 
applies to small state and territory jurisdictions.
Ease of submitting a claim
It is harder for an injured employee to submit 
a workers’ compensation claim within the 
Comcare scheme when compared with the 
process in many of the states and territories. 
A best practice approach is one that encourages 
immediate injury reporting as the evidence shows 
that this leads to improved outcomes for employers 
and employees, leading to an earlier return to work 
by the injured employee.42 For example, the length 
of the standard claim form used in the Comcare 
scheme is twenty pages (with nine pages the sole 
purview of the employee). By way of comparison, in 
New South Wales, an employee needs to complete 
only four pages of the claim form. 
Another barrier to immediate injury reporting may 
be the way in which a claim form is required to be 
lodged. The SRC Act requires a “written claim” to 
be given to Comcare (in the case of employees 
of premium paying agencies) or to the licensee (in 
the case of self-insurers). In contrast, several of 
the state and territory jurisdictions have amended 
their processes to enable lodgment of claims 
electronically, or by facsimile or telephone.43 
The assumption behind the myriad of claim 
forms with Comcare is that the employee who is 
claiming is a public servant and has access to a 
range of material to complete the forms and it is 
inherent also in this process that the claimant has 
a reasonable level of literacy. If a broader range of 
employers is allowed to enter the scheme as self 
insurers, Comcare will need to adapt its claims 
process to allow for a much simpler claims process 
as is the case in most other jurisdictions.
Comcare’s Performance
Comcare’s performance is critical to the effectiveness of the national workers’ 
compensation scheme. Comcare’s role is multi-faceted. It involves the evaluation 
of self-insurance licence applications, monitoring and enforcing work health and 
safety standards, claims management standards and return to work practices 
for both self-insurers and premium payers. 
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The inspectorate’s role and size
A common criticism of the SRC Bill is that the 
scheme regulator only has 53 inspectors and 
there has been no concomitant commitment by 
the current government to expand the Comcare 
inspectorate in order to deal with the expected 
increase in their workload.44 Comcare has 
responded to this concern by stating that it does 
have the operational capacity to cope with an 
increased workload because it will hire more 
inspectors if such a need arises.45 
Whilst it is true that Comcare only presently has 
a small number of inspectors, it is also true that 
Comcare’s number of inspectors compared to state 
and territory inspectors per 10,000 employees is 
similar to that of NSW and Victoria but is lower 
than the ratio for the smaller jurisdictions. Thus, it 
is hard to sustain an argument that Comcare has 
a significantly lower level of inspectors as although 
this is true numerically, in terms of the proportion 
of workers within the scheme, Comcare’s ratio of 
inspectors to number of workers covered by the 
scheme is comparable to that of the two largest 
states. Nonetheless, if more employers are 
involved in the Comcare scheme as envisaged 
under the SRC Bill, then the scheme will have 
significant geographical reach and more 
inspectors will be needed.
In a number of other important respects the 
Comcare inspectorate operates at a diminished 
capacity when compared with inspectorates in other 
jurisdictions. This was identified in the Taylor Fry 
report, which involved a comprehensive examination 
of the self-insurance scheme commissioned 
by the Federal Government in 2008. The report 
recommended the rectification of each of these 
issues before an expansion of Comcare’s role can 
take place in order to prevent a regulatory vacuum.
Firstly, the expertise, background and 
experience of Comcare inspectors are below 
par. The Taylor Fry report notes the preponderance 
of ex-police amongst Comcare inspectors 
rather than those with industry expertise and 
recommends that Comcare should broaden its 
recruitment practices.46 
This report also recognised that Comcare’s training 
of inspectors tended to be narrower than the 
specialised, in-house training occurring within 
the state and territory regulators.47 For example, 
Western Australia and Victoria offer specialist 
courses of around three to six months duration, 
including periods of supervised workplace 
interaction where skills can be tested and honed.
Secondly, Comcare inspectors are organised 
in the capital cities and have less capacity to 
monitor geographically disparate areas. 
An example provided in the Taylor Fry report 
provides a useful illustration of this challenge for 
Comcare’s inspectorate:
When a rockfall occurred at the 
Beaconsfield gold mine at around 
9.23pm on 25 April 2006, state mine 
inspectors based in Hobart were able 
to reach the mine within four hours 
to take control of the site, overview 
rescue efforts, and commence 
their investigation. Had the mine 
been under Comcare’s jurisdiction, 
investigators based in Melbourne 
would not have been able to reach 
the mine before the first commercial 
flight into Hobart, followed by a forty 
minute drive to Launceston (at least 
10-11 hours after the incident). In 
relation to the timing of that incident it 
should be noted that much long haul 
trucking activity occurs late at night 
so it is quite possible that Comcare 
investigators could be called to a 
serious incident late at night. Further, 
large manufacturing operations (and 
related construction) can be found 
in locations remote from capital 
cities such as Traralgon, Karratha 
and Gladstone and this is why state 
agencies have located regional offices 
to service them.48
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Another weakness related to the organisational 
structure of the Comcare inspectorate, is that 
Comcare inspectors are not organised in industry 
teams and regional teams like in the other 
jurisdictions. This concern was identified in the 
Taylor Fry report which stated, ‘this is especially the 
case with construction sites and transport company 
depots/warehouses, a number of which will be 
located outside capital cities and even in quite remote 
locations in vast states like Queensland and Western 
Australia. Although Comcare has emphasised the 
mobility of its investigators, the present structure and 
deployment of its investigators does not allow the sort 
of ready response that might be required to a serious 
incident.’49 
Thirdly, Comcare inspectors tend to be less 
rigorous in their investigation procedures. As 
concluded in the Taylor Fry report, whose authors 
accompanied both Comcare inspectors and those 
from the states and territories on a significant number 
of workplace visits, ‘Comcare investigators do not 
conduct the kinds of more wide ranging informal 
inspections that state OHS inspectors seem to 
conduct.’50 The report’s authors also noted that state 
and territory inspectors generally displayed ‘significant 
skills in identifying priority OHS issues and dealing 
with difficult situations. Such skills were less evident in 
most of our visits with Comcare investigators.’51
Fourthly, Comcare does not presently staff experts 
to provide specialist advice pertaining to high-
risk industries or regarding certain hazards. 
By way of comparison, regulators in Victoria and 
Western Australia maintain separate teams to deal 
with high hazard workplaces (such as major chemical 
manufacturing and storage facilities). Those special 
hazards teams normally include technical experts able 
to offer specialised advice within that team or other 
teams when required. 
For its part, the Comcare inspectorate does not 
possess specialist resources in-house and only 
has a reference list of experts it can call upon. 
According to the Taylor Fry report, this approach ‘has 
disadvantages in terms of timing, cost and policy/
practice coherence where there is a routine and 
ongoing demand for such expertise. If Comcare were 
to expand its coverage, such requirements could be 
expected to grow.’52 
The argument that a diminished Comcare inspectorate 
and enforcement capacity is acceptable because the 
Comcare scheme only includes large employers with 
more sophisticated approaches to systematic work 
health and safety management does not withstand 
close scrutiny. This is because even within the state 
and territory jurisdictions, over half the employees 
work for businesses with more than 100 employees, 
and as the Taylor Fry report concludes, ‘It was not 
our observed experience that state OHS inspectors 
were unlikely to find grounds for issuing notices in the 
workplaces of large employers, including those with 
elaborate OHS management systems. In some we 
observed the ‘elaborate’ system had failed to identify 
and address serious hazards…large companies with 
mature to systematic OHS management are not 
immune to serious and even catastrophic failings.’53 
Furthermore, as the SRC Bill does not require a 
minimum number of employees in each state in order 
for an employer to be eligible for self-insurance, 
it is quite possible that some of these multi-state 
businesses will have worksites which are potentially 
very small or geographically remote, with an immature 
approach to work health and safety management.
Level of enforcement activity
There are clear concerns about Comcare’s approach 
to enforcement, which tends to favour workshops 
and presentations to employers, rather than 
employer-initiated workplace visits and reactive 
workplace visits. The Taylor Fry report back in 
2008 identified this difference as a key drawback of 
Comcare’s regulatory approach, stating:
Overall the workplace visit regime 
undertaken by Comcare differs from that 
of other OHS agencies in Australia, or 
those within a number of other countries 
with which we are familiar (such as the 
UK, Sweden or Norway). State and 
territory regimes have moved away from 
a reactive approach because it is viewed 
as not securing the best outcomes and 
ineffective in terms of its use of available 
resources. Nor is it consistent with what 
we would understand to be generally 
accepted ‘best practice’ with regard to 
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OHS enforcement. This inconsistency 
needs to be addressed if genuinely a 
more uniform system of OHS regulation 
is to be established in Australia. There 
are other limitations with compliant-
based enforcement. These include that 
the inspectorate may be unaware of 
an issue at a workplace where earlier 
intervention might prevent the situation 
escalating into an incident.54
Despite the Taylor Fry report identifying Comcare’s 
approach to enforcement as a key weakness in its 
ability to be an effective regulator, recent statistics 
suggest that in the intervening five year period, 
Comcare is still well behind the state and territory 
jurisdictions in this regard. 
Unlike the state and territory regulators which tend 
to combine in relatively equal measure a mixture of 
reactive and proactive interventions, a far greater 
proportion of Comcare’s enforcement activity 
is predicated on delivering workshops and 
presentations which are a far less effective 
method in securing compliance with WHS laws. 
For example, 21% of Comcare’s total enforcement 
activity is dedicated to delivering workshops and 
presentations whereas this figure is 0.4%, 4.7% and 
1.1% for NSW, Queensland and WA respectively. 
The Taylor Fry report recognises the limitations of 
both the ‘advise and persuade’ approach and the 
deterrence approach and suggests a responsive 
enforcement model using an interactive and 
graduated enforcement response like that used in 
most of the states and territories.55
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
10162 21040 27785 5243 10329 3224 935 195 3091
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
12782 19782 1754 4571 7428 3230 2889 1574 536
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
223 n/a 1886 334 442 257 94 168 1776
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
28777 n/a 9111 19365 10726 0 357 0 3098
Number of workplace visits (proactive) in 2012-201356
Number of workplace visits (reactive) in 2012-201357
Number of workshops/presentations/seminars/forums in 2012-201358
Other reactive interventions 2012-201359
THE
McKell
Institute
MCKELL INSTITUTE  |  Unsafe and Unfair A critique of the Safety, Rehabilitation Compensation  
Legislation Amendment  |  Bill 201428
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
80 91 98 28 26 8 1 3 2
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
6118 16137 5494 11967 1951 105 138 544 19
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
551 476 1360 553 832 122 109 177 18
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT AUS GOV (COMCARE)
0.2% 0.63% 0.3% 1.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.01%
Number of legal proceedings finalised in 2012-201361
Number of improvement notices issued in 2012-201362
Number of prohibition notices issued in 2012-201363
Number of notices awarded as a % of number of employees in the scheme in 2012-201364
Another area of weakness in Comcare’s enforcement capacity is that Comcare has historically initiated 
low rates of prosecutions. This is concerning because the Comcare scheme is a no-fault scheme which is 
not able to expose safety failure through common law or other examination processes. The available evidence 
indicates the use of prosecutions is on par with the NT and ACT as the three least prosecutorial jurisdictions.60
Furthermore Comcare inspectors issue far fewer improvement notices and prohibition notices than 
inspectors in the state and territory jurisdictions. Even though the number of workers covered by the Comcare 
scheme is double that of those in the NT and ACT schemes, the number of notices issued is significantly less. 
The final table below shows the number of notices awarded as a percentage of the number of employees covered 
by the scheme. This clearly demonstrates that inspectors in the Comcare scheme issue nowhere near as many 
improvement and prohibition notices as inspectors in the state and territory schemes.
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Timeframes for claim decision67
Number of notices awarded as a % of number of employees in the scheme in 2012-201364
Monitoring work health and safety 
across a range of industries
A common assertion against the expansion of the 
Comcare scheme as envisaged by the SRC Bill is 
that Comcare is ill equipped to deal with a range of 
industries as it was primarily designed for white-collar 
workers in the public service. This has been rebutted 
by Comcare who identifies the range of industries 
it has experience with and is supported by the 
conclusion of the Taylor Fry report’s authors that ‘any 
reasonable analysis shows that the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction has always covered the entire spectrum 
of employment types and OHS risks.’65 
Whilst it may be true that Comcare has overseen 
a wide range of industries and activities, at issue is 
the extent of this coverage and Comcare’s specialist 
expertise in these areas when compared to the 
scheme regulators in the states and territories. As 
has already been identified in the section on the 
Comcare’s inspectorate, the other jurisdictions invest 
more in training their inspectors in monitoring high-
risk industries and are structured to better identify 
breaches and enforce standards in these industries. 
It seems apparent that the states and territories 
have greater sophistication and specialised 
practices around high-risk industries and 
occupations. Furthermore, some of the large 
mining states such as WA and QLD have 
developed their own specialist regulator to 
deal with the particular issues arising from 
the mining, petroleum, gas and explosive 
industries. If employers in these industries 
move to the Comcare scheme, they will no 
longer be accountable to these specialist 
regulators, and Comcare does not possess 
sufficient knowledge or expertise in these areas.
Another issue is that an increasing initiative at the 
state and territory level is to drill down the relevant 
legislative requirements and articulate standards 
specific to the industry by producing industry-
specific codes of practice. This development 
of industry specific codes provides a single, 
comprehensive reference point for employers and 
other stakeholders. The Taylor Fry report identifies 
that ‘Comcare does not appear to have 
developed industry-specific codes to cover 
self-insurers in hazardous industries such as 
construction and road transport.’66
Timelines for processing claims
The Comcare scheme is the only jurisdiction that 
administers its compensation scheme without 
mandated time frames for decision-making about 
liability and benefit payment. 
NSW Provisional liability within 7 days after notification of injury  and the decision on ongoing liability within 21 days.
VIC 28 days for weekly payments if received by insurer within 10 days  or 39 days in other circumstances
QLD Claims must be determined within 20 business days
WA Insurers have up to14 days.
SA 10 Business daysdays in other circumstances
TAS 84 days
NT 10 working days after receipt by employer if no decision has been made
ACT 28 days
AUS GOV 
(COMCARE)
No legislated timeframes for claim decisions. However, determining authorities  
are required to make determinations accurately and quickly.
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The SRC Act only stipulates that claims should 
be processed in a ‘reasonable period of time.’ 
The Comcare scheme could be greatly improved 
if the Act was amended to provide prescribed 
timeframes for the assessment and disputation of a 
claim, including penalties where those timeframes 
are unmet. This was recommended by the Hanks 
report which said that if statutory timeframes 
were not met, the claim could be deemed to be 
rejected.68 
The advantages of mandating timeframes are clear: 
it results in speedier dispute resolution and an 
earlier return to work for an injured employee. This 
is because early intervention is crucial in reducing 
the lifecycle of an injury. 
This benefits both the employer and employee, 
and also the scheme as a whole. Thus, a clear 
weakness in the Comcare scheme, which is not 
addressed at all by the SRC Bill, is the absence of 
statutorily mandated timelines for the processing 
of claims. This point should not be understated, 
because those claims which are contested 
are invariably a proxy for the hardest and most 
expensive claims. Delays in resolving those claims 
lead to delays in recovery and additional expenses 
for all parties. 
Dispute resolution
The Comcare scheme is by far the least efficient for 
resolving disputes. This is an immediate problem 
that needs to be rectified before an expansion of 
the Comcare scheme can be considered. 
In addition to waiting long periods for insurers/
employers to make decisions, injured workers 
under Comcare wait significantly longer for dispute 
resolution than injured workers in any other 
scheme. For example in 2011-12, 51.6% of 
injured workers with disputed claims under 
Comcare did not have their claims resolved 
within 9 months. This is compared with 4.9% 
in NSW, 12.3% in Victoria and 4.7% in QLD.69 
The dispute resolution system of Comcare is not 
equipped for the expanded workload that would 
result from more self-insurers. 
If the dispute resolution process within Comcare 
is exhausted, the next step for a worker is to go 
to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the AAT’). 
The AAT provides merit reviews of administrative 
decisions and determines whether the outcome of 
the claim was the ‘correct or preferable’ decision. 
Despite the intention that the AAT jurisdiction be 
efficient, informal, quick and fair, its burgeoning 
operation has meant that its processes are 
increasingly complex and lengthy. 
The Hanks report recommended ‘that the AAT be 
encouraged to explore practical ways to achieve a 
further, and marked, reduction in the time taken to 
resolve compensation applications.’70 
The Hanks report also recommended that an 
employee’s costs be borne by the insurer at the 
reconsideration stage so as to encourage the 
resolution of disputes prior to reaching the AAT 
and to mitigate against the tendency of employers 
and insurers to delay proceedings reaching the 
AAT and further drawing out the dispute resolution 
process.71
Thus, it is clear that a primary drawback of the 
Comcare scheme is its inability to resolve disputes 
in a timely manner. Instead, Comcare’s design 
encourages employers to stonewall and draw 
disputes out rather than resolve them. This 
exacerbates the inherent weaknesses of employees 
in resolving workers’ compensation disputes as 
most workers are unfamiliar with the scheme, 
whereas employers and insurers tend to develop 
expertise regarding the schemes practices and 
procedures over time. 
This observation has been identified by Australia’s 
leading scholars in the workers’ compensation 
area: ‘the Comcare dispute process has been 
notoriously labyrinthine. A fundamental change 
in the processes is needed to address delays in 
dispute resolution at commonwealth level. This 
would involve revamping the scheme to include 
emphasis on mediation and conciliation and the 
use of litigation as a last resort.’72
MCKELL INSTITUTE  |  Unsafe and Unfair A critique of the Safety, Rehabilitation Compensation 
Legislation Amendment  |  Bill 2014 31
KEY FINDINGS
When compared with its state and territory 
counterparts, Comcare does not operate 
as efficiently or effectively. Comcare has 
conducted far fewer workplace interventions, 
proactive and reactive workplace visits; 
its investigators have issued far fewer 
improvement and prohibition notices; and 
the agency has launched far fewer legal 
proceedings.
The risks that self-insurance can be open to abuse 
by unscrupulous employers needs to be accounted 
for. These employers may seek to use self-
insurance as a way of avoiding paying premiums 
but may not be genuinely oriented to assisting 
injured workers to return to work. 
Due to resourcing and structural constraints, 
Comcare is not adequately equipped to monitor 
performance or hold self-insurers to account on 
a national scale if the self-insurer does not meet 
injury management and return to work obligations. 
Because of this, an expansion of the Comcare 
scheme should not occur at the present time.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Before an expansion of the Comcare scheme can 
be considered, Comcare’s inspectorate needs to 
be performing at a level on par with, or better than, 
the state inspectorates. In light of this objective, we 
make the following recommendations:
1. Clear provision should be made for a 
concomitant commitment to expand the 
Comcare inspectorate in order to deal with the 
expected increase in their workload. 
2. There needs to be better training and 
recruitment of Comcare’s inspectors. 
3. Comcare needs to develop in-house specialist 
inspectors for high-risk industries and 
occupations. 
4. Comcare needs to restructure its inspectorate 
so that it includes regional teams and teams 
with industry expertise.
5. Comcare needs to demonstrate a greater 
preparedness to use its prosecutorial function 
and powers to issue improvement and 
prohibition notices.
6. Comcare needs to develop industry codes. In 
developing these codes, Comcare should draw 
upon knowledge and expertise at the state level 
for managing regulatory challenges arising from 
high-risk industries and occupations.
7. Comcare’s dispute resolution process needs to 
be reformed as an immediate priority to ensure 
the speedier and fairer resolution of claims. 
8. Employers should bear costs for dispute 
resolution prior to the dispute reaching the AAT. 
9. Provision should be made for provisional liability 
as in a number of state jurisdictions.
10. Like in all of the other state and territory 
jurisdictions, the Comcare scheme should 
include statutory timelines for dispute resolution.
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Workers
The primary purpose of any workers’ compensation 
scheme is to prevent work related illness and 
injury from occurring in the first place. The 
secondary purpose is to provide adequate benefits 
to assist and compensate those workers who 
are unfortunately injured or ill as a result of their 
work. For a number of reasons, the SRC Bill will 
significantly reduce workplace health and 
safety standards and the benefits workers 
receive in the event of an injury or death.
First and foremost, the mooted expansion of the 
Comcare scheme coupled with the operational and 
resourcing deficiencies of the scheme regulator, 
means that workers covered by the Comcare 
scheme will be worse off. Their claims will be 
processed less efficaciously, the inspectorate 
charged with protecting them will be weaker 
and less skilled, and the dispute resolution 
process will be far lengthier and more 
cumbersome. 
This has serious ramifications for whether an injured 
employee will be able to return to work. Self-
insurance will be open to abuse by employers who 
do not wish to assist injured workers to return to 
work because Comcare is not adequately equipped 
to monitor performance or hold self-insurers to 
account on a national scale if the self-insurer does 
not meet return to work obligations. In a number 
of critical ways, the Comcare scheme operates 
less efficiently and effectively than regulators in 
the states and territories, which results in poorer 
protection for workers under the Comcare scheme.
Secondly, the SRC Bill provides workers with no 
choice as to which workers’ compensation scheme 
will cover them. The Bill further embeds managerial 
prerogative by providing employers with a unilateral 
entitlement to move to the national scheme if they 
operate in more than one state. 
This failure to consult workers and include 
them in the decision-making process 
contradicts international best practice in 
designing workers’ compensation schemes. 
The Taylor Fry report suggests there is a strong 
business case for involving workers in these types 
of decisions:
As workers bear the brunt of 
failure to manage OHS, and 
because they are likely to have 
firs hand knowledge of hazards, 
and ways of abating them, 
there are ethical and practical 
reasons to ensure that workers 
are engaged in participatory 
mechanisms. A growing body of 
evidence demonstrates the positive 
benefits of worker participation 
in OHS, including a relationship 
between objective indicators of 
worker participation (such as 
injury rates or hazard exposure) 
in workplaces where structures 
of worker representation are in 
Section Two: 
The Impact of the SRC Bill 
on Stakeholders 
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place (union presence, 
joint safety committees 
or worker/union safety 
representatives). This 
evidence comes from 
many countries, including 
those where participatory 
mechanisms are not 
mandated by legislation.73
Thirdly, the SRC Bill effectively excludes 
the possibility of a common law claim, 
which means that workers will lose 
access to common law protection and 
compensation in all jurisdictions other 
than the Northern Territory and South 
Australia. Other than in these two 
jurisdictions and the Comcare scheme, 
most other workers’ compensation 
schemes in Australia are hybrid 
schemes that include both ‘no-fault’ 
statutory entitlements and common law 
compensation for injuries. 
Access to common law damages is a 
fundamental element of any workers’ 
compensation system. Awards at 
common law can more closely reflect 
community standards and expectations 
with regards to proven employer 
negligence. Awards at common law also 
provide scope for those more seriously 
injured as a result of the negligence 
of their employer to exit the workers’ 
compensation system with dignity 
while maintaining financial surety. The 
processes of the common law serve 
the occupational, health and safety 
objectives of the scheme because 
they examine the causes of injury and 
expose negligent and harmful practices. 
The common law holds to account 
employers whose negligent actions or 
failures have caused or contributed to a 
workplace injury.
THE IMPACT OF THE 
SRC BILL ON WORKERS’ 
COMMON LAW RIGHTS
If a worker is injured as a result of her employer’s 
negligence and cannot return to work because of 
a continuing 15% whole person impairment, this 
worker will be significantly worse off under the 
Comcare scheme. 
Assuming the worker was earning an annual wage of 
$125,000 prior to the injury and she initially receives 
80% of her wages for 10 months until the injury 
stabilises, under the Comcare scheme, she cannot 
claim any common law damages even though the 
injury was indisputably the employer’s fault. 
Although it is difficult to categorically assert what 
this worker would receive at common law in the 
state and territory schemes, case law suggests that 
the following would occur.
In Queensland, the common law would be likely to 
award a payout in the region of $300,000 for future 
economic loss. 
In Victoria, the worker would be likely to produce a 
$500,000 payment for pain and suffering and loss of 
earnings. 
Within the NSW scheme, the worker would be able 
to claim common law damages potentially worth 
$390,000 to $780,000 assuming she has a 40-50% 
loss of potential future earnings. 
In the ACT, the worker can pursue a common law 
damages claim and would be likely to receive an 
award of between $350,000 to $650,000. This range 
is based on around $100,000 for general damages 
and maybe $150,000 to $200,000 for past and future 
wage loss where it takes two or three years to retrain 
her to a job at equal pay. 
CASE STUDY 1: 
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Fourthly, the SRC Bill will necessarily produce an 
inequitable and inconsistent approach to workers’ 
compensation in Australia. It will mean that 
workers in the same state will be eligible for 
substantially different levels of compensation 
even though they incurred precisely the same 
injury, simply by virtue of whether or not their 
employer is in the Comcare scheme or a 
state or territory scheme. This is both arbitrary 
and capricious. 
Not dissimilarly, marked variations can be expected 
in premiums faced by employers with identical 
risk profiles, operating in the same jurisdiction, 
depending on which scheme is covering an 
employer. This will also allow employers, but not 
workers, to cherry-pick the scheme that they 
prefer. It is to be expected that employers will 
make this decision according to their financial 
interests. Thus, the SRC Bill subordinates the 
protection of injured workers to the financial 
interests of employers, thereby encouraging 
an animation towards low-cost, low-entitlement 
workers’ compensation schemes in Australia.
Finally in terms of entitlements to workers the SRC 
Act does not currently allow for redemptions or 
commutations of weekly payments. As there is 
no common law access under the Act, workers 
are effectively trapped into long term claims. 
Amending common law access or allowing 
payment of lump sums to finalise claims would be 
consistent with other jurisdictions. Notably in the 
case of a self-insurer Comcare does not have a 
role in rehabilitation as this is left to the employer. 
Where the self-insured employer cannot retain 
a worker then Comcare should have a role in 
assisting that claimant.
This report also notes that Comcare has particularly 
harsh stress-related claim provisions as a result 
of the case of Hart v Comcare [2005] FCR 29 
where the Federal Court held that if a single 
significant contributing to an injury or disease was 
a “reasonable administrative action” then the claim 
would no longer be considered sustainable. This 
rule is harsh and means that workers whose stress 
arises predominantly from work factors may not be 
able to claim by reason of a single administrative 
stressor. 
Another concern for claimants is that in terms 
of the calculation of wages, Comcare is the only 
system which requires wages be calculated 
to include superannuation payments so as to 
reduce the amount paid by the employer – this 
is unfair and in effect means that the claimant 
is underwriting to some extent their own claim. 
Similarly the calculation of wages under Comcare is 
extremely complex and probably more so than any 
other jurisdiction. 
The impairment tables adopted under the SCR Act 
and by reason of the decision in Canute v Comcare 
[2006] HCA 47 are almost incomprehensible and 
at times inconsistent (as in the case of Tables 9.7 
and 9.14). These matters are concrete example of 
where a claimant is worse off under Comcare than 
other schemes.
Small and medium  
sized businesses
Although the SRC Bill broadens the range of 
corporations that can apply to Comcare for a 
self-insurance licence, it distinctly disadvantages 
employers who only operate in one state as they 
are automatically barred from entering the Comcare 
scheme. This is true of most small and medium 
businesses, which by virtue of their small size, are 
unlikely to meet ‘the national employer test.’ It is 
also true of two thirds of large employers who only 
have operations in one state. Thus, a significant 
number of employers will be unable to elect to 
move to the Comcare scheme. 
On the one hand, it is possible to argue that 
because only 1959 employers are eligible to move 
to the Comcare scheme, it is likely that the number 
of employers exiting the state and territory schemes 
will be fairly minimal. Indeed, this sentiment is 
expressed a number of times in the SRC Bill’s 
explanatory memorandum,74 which quotes the 
conclusion in the Taylor Fry report that: 
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All the available evidence suggests 
that the actual impacts on state and 
territory workers’ compensation 
schemes of corporations exiting 
those schemes to join Comcare 
have been insignificant. The 
likelihood of future impacts being 
significant is low.75
However, the accuracy of this conclusion is 
subject to the exact design and nature of the 
reforms expanding the Comcare scheme as 
the Taylor Fry report’s authors did not have a 
specific model to examine at the time. Thus, 
given that the SRC Bill allows more employers 
to move across and such a move will result in 
lower premiums, lesser protection of workplace 
health and safety and a national regulator with 
a weaker enforcement capacity than its state 
and territory counterparts, it is likely that most, 
if not all of the 1959 employers will elect to 
move to the Comcare scheme based on a fairly 
straightforward cost/benefit analysis. Given 
that Comcare only currently regulates 29 
self-insurers, this potentially represents a 
massive expansion of the national scheme 
of 67 times its present capacity.76
Under this scenario, there will be a significant 
number of employers who will make the decision 
to leave the state and territory schemes in favour 
of the Comcare scheme. In fact, the SRC Bill’s 
authors suggest that such a shift is likely and 
intended given the substantial red tape savings 
that employers moving across to the Comcare 
scheme will incur.
This possibility that significant numbers of 
employers would be attracted to an expanded 
Comcare scheme was explicitly recognised by the 
Productivity Commission which concluded:
The opening up of a national 
scheme to all corporate employers 
would have potentially significant 
impacts on the existing State and 
Territory scheme…Some of the 
smaller schemes may ultimately 
become more unviable on a 
stand-alone basis if a significant 
number of employers switch to 
the national scheme.77
In fact, when the Productivity Commission proposed 
in 2004 that the Comcare scheme be expanded 
to incorporate multi-state employers, some 
business associations expressed clear reservations 
concerning the need for a national scheme.78
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EMPLOYER LOOPHOLES AND  
THE SRC BILL
The ‘national employer test’ is not an effective test of whether an 
employer is genuinely multi-state in its operation, which is why this 
report proposes that there be a minimum number of employees 
required in each state. The way the test currently operates under the 
SRC Bill is that an unscrupulous employer wishing to evade the more 
onerous requirements and higher premiums of a state and territory 
scheme could do so by simply setting up a one-person office in 
another state. There are many reasons why an employer might seek to 
migrate to the Comcare scheme if the SRC Bill is passed:
1. Comcare offers lower premiums than the state and territory 
schemes.
2. Comcare has less strict requirements than the state and territory 
schemes in allowing employers to access a self-insurance licence. 
To date, Comcare has never rejected a self-insurance licence 
application.
3. Comcare is a less effective regulator and therefore provides less 
rigorous scrutiny of workplace safety.
4. The Comcare scheme allows employers and insurers to delay in 
resolving claims as it is the only system without statutory timelines 
and its dispute resolution system is notoriously ineffective, complex 
and slow.
5. Comcare effectively prevents workers who are injured as a result of 
employer negligence from suing at common law.
6. Comcare inspectors issue far fewer improvement notices and 
prohibition notices than inspectors in the state and territory 
jurisdictions and are significantly less likely to instigate 
prosecutions.
7. Some employers will be able to evade the scrutiny of specialist 
regulators designed to address particular issues arising from high-
risk industries as Comcare is a generalist regulator. For example, in 
large mining states such as Western Australia and Queensland, the 
mining, petroleum and gas and explosive industries have their own 
specialist regulator.
CASE STUDY 2: 
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The concern that the SRC Bill will produce a 
reduced premium pool for the state and territory 
schemes was identified by each of the state and 
territory governments in their submissions to 
the Senate inquiry on the SRC Bill. For example, 
the then Queensland Newman Coalition government 
was concerned that ‘small businesses may not be 
in a position to absorb premium fluctuations from a 
reduced premium pool’ and projected that the SRC 
Bill would result in a reduction in the state’s premium 
income of over $250 million (18 per cent of $1.4 billion 
premium pool).79 
This means that because there are fewer 
businesses within the state and territory schemes 
to pay premiums, the premium pool as a whole 
will be reduced for each of the state and territory 
schemes. This reduced premium pool in the 
non-Comcare workers’ compensation schemes 
will result in increased premiums for remaining 
businesses in those schemes and put pressure to 
reduce workers’ entitlements.
The SRC Bill may also force some small businesses 
to close down because they will be unable to 
cope with increased premiums. As stated by the 
Queensland government in its submission:
The Amendment Bill will have potential 
impacts on business well beyond 
companies eligible for national self-
insurance. In Queensland there are 
an estimated 138,000 private sector 
non-agricultural small businesses 
(employing fewer than 20 workers), 
many of these small businesses 
may not be in a position to absorb 
premium fluctuations from a reduced 
premium pool.80
In sum, small and medium businesses that will 
be forced to remain in the state systems are 
likely to experience higher premiums because 
of a reduced premium pool. Many large 
businesses will also be subject to this if they 
operate within the confines of a single state. 
The business case for the SRC Bill is clearly on 
shaky ground when the vast majority of Australian 
businesses will be disadvantaged by its passing.
Multi-state businesses
The clearest beneficiaries of the SRC Bill are multi-
state businesses. The SRC Bill was conceived 
with their interests in mind and the Government 
anticipates that its passing will lead to significant 
cost savings for businesses that choose to move to 
the Comcare scheme. The SRC Bill’s Explanatory 
Memorandum relies on data from the Productivity 
Commission report to quantify a projection of these 
cost savings.81 The Productivity Commission relied 
on submissions from some multi-state employers 
to identify costs associated with having to report in 
multiple jurisdictions and the savings which would 
ensue from being able to operate under the one 
national system. The Explanatory Memorandum 
refers to the Insurance Australia Group’s estimate 
of an annual cost saving of $1.7 million, Optus’s 
estimate of $2 million and Skilled Engineering’s 
estimate of $2.5 million.82 Using these submissions 
to the Productivity Commission review, the 
Explanatory Memorandum forecasts that a multi-
state business moving to the Comcare scheme will 
incur annual savings of $400,000 for each state or 
territory that it operates in.83
Whilst seemingly attractive, the evidential basis 
for these projected cost-savings for multi-state 
businesses is questionable. In a comprehensive 
review of the Productivity Commission report, a 
number of leading scholars in this area wrote a 
damning review of its methodology and findings. 
Guthrie et al argue:
That the Productivity Commission 
was prepared to entertain the 
demise of several State and Territory 
workers’ compensation systems 
in pursuit of its agenda for change 
was not unexpected, given that 
it regarded compliance costs for 
multi-state firms as the central issue 
facing workers’ compensation 
policy in Australia. Nevertheless, 
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its case for change remained less 
than persuasive. Not only were 
compliance costs for multi-State 
employers firms not estimated with 
any semblance of precision, it was 
by no means clear that the benefits 
to these firms from a new national 
scheme would be substantial, 
let alone outweigh the costs that 
would be born by the overwhelming 
majority of firms that would remain 
in the State and Territory schemes. 
For a change in public policy of this 
magnitude, a thorough examination 
of the nature and extent of the costs 
and benefits involved is an essential 
prerequisite. This, the Productivity 
Commission failed to provide.’84
It is concerning that the primary arguments for 
the SRC Bill are reliant on a dubious evidential 
basis predicated on the submissions of multi-
state businesses, the very interest group 
lobbying the hardest for the expansion of the 
Comcare scheme. It is clear that independent 
actuarial analysis needs to be done as to the 
cost savings likely to be incurred by multi-state 
businesses and the impact that an expansion of the 
Comcare scheme will have on businesses remaining 
the state and territory jurisdictions. Without this 
analysis, the case for moving to expand the 
Comcare scheme is highly suspect. 
Another adverse consequence for multi-state 
businesses is that the SRC Bill will provide them 
with lesser support, advice and monitoring of their 
work health and safety systems. The Comcare 
scheme does not operate as effectively as its state 
and territory counterparts and Comcare cannot 
offer the same level of assistance, scrutiny and 
support that is offered by scheme regulators in 
these other jurisdictions. 
The national economy
The passage of the SRC Bill will jeopardise the 
national interest through greater pressure on the 
welfare system, Medicare and the national disability 
insurance scheme. Because the Comcare scheme 
provides lesser support to injured workers, although 
businesses will incur lower premiums, the costs 
of rehabilitating these workers will shift to the 
public purse and result in the financial burden 
being transferred to the social security system 
and Medicare. Furthermore, the effective abolition 
of a worker’s common law rights under the Comcare 
scheme means that the negligent employer is not 
obliged to compensate the worker, meaning that 
in effect, employers would be subsidised for work-
related injury costs by the public.
This ‘cost shifting’ from the employer to the public 
purse was identified by the Industry Commission, 
which argued that it can undermine the motivation 
for employers to adopt a best practice approach 
to work health and safety by facilitating early 
intervention and rehabilitation of injured workers.85 
Similar concerns to those raised by the Industry 
Commission also featured in the findings of the 
National Commission of Audit, which reported on 
the issue to the Howard Government in 1996,86 and 
more recently the Productivity Commission in its 
2004 inquiry.87 
Although this is remarkably absent from the SRC 
Bill, which seeks to reduce the regulatory burden 
on employers at the expense of the national 
interest, all three Commissions acknowledged 
the need for policy responses to tackle cost 
shifting. For example, the Industry Commission 
report called for a more adequate compensation 
package for injured workers which would result in 
employers, rather than the social security system, 
bearing more of the brunt for the costs arising from 
workplace injuries.88
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This report has shown how the SRC Bill 
disadvantages each of the key stakeholders in the 
workers’ compensation arena, namely workers 
and the vast majority of Australian businesses. In 
fact, the only stakeholder alleged to benefit from 
the SRC Bill are multi-state businesses, but even 
there, this benefit has only been quantified through 
anecdotal evidence provided by these businesses 
as no independent actuarial analysis has been 
conducted. 
It is clear then, that the SRC Bill is a hasty, ad-hoc 
attempt to create a national workers’ compensation 
system and should be rejected.
Creating a national workers’ compensation 
system should not be based on a lowest common 
denominator approach. There are concrete 
examples of where workers will be worse off, 
for example in the calculation and payment of 
wages. Importantly there is evidence that where 
compensation schemes reduce benefits to 
workers, claimants seek other systems, notably 
industrial systems, for recourse. 
When this happens employers pay these costs 
directly, for example:
1. The removal of journey cover in most 
jurisdictions resulted in industrial claims for 
employers to pay for specific journey cover for 
workers under other insurance.
2. The introduction of stress claim exclusions 
arguably resulted in increases in sick leave 
where stress claims could not be made.
3. Where compensation systems ceased 
payments at aged 65 (now most systems have 
removed this barrier), logs of claims sought 
payment of workers compensation style 
benefits direct from employers.
4. Slow dispute resolution results in extended 
sick leave, poor return to work and added 
costs to employer for replacement costs of 
employees.
5. Poor safety interventions result in industrial 
action under WHS provisions.
Conclusion
Working towards a nationally consistent framework for workers’ compensation 
is a desirable policy goal. It is an objective that most stakeholders agree 
with. What is in contention is how to achieve it. The SRC Bill represents an 
evidentially unsound and dangerous route to achieving a national workers’ 
compensation scheme. 
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The point to be made is that if the interests of 
workers are neglected there is likely to be a leakage 
of claims into other areas.
The best practices from the state and territory 
systems should be used to design a national 
scheme which appropriately compensates injured 
workers and efficiently manages their return to the 
workplace. 
The objective of a nationally consistent framework 
for workers’ compensation should not be about a 
race to the bottom, but instead an opportunity to 
produce a best practice system that is the envy of 
other countries. 
This report has identified a number of key 
recommendations that the federal government 
should adopt before legislating to move towards a 
national workers’ compensation scheme. 
In particular, the scheme regulator Comcare 
needs to be operating at a far superior level than it 
currently does and the provisions with regards to 
self-insurance need to be more robustly regulated. 
Consideration also needs to be given to the impact 
of a national scheme on state and territory workers’ 
compensation schemes and how this will affect the 
premium pool. 
Proper and independent actuarial analysis needs 
to be commissioned to explore the financial impact 
of a national workers’ compensation scheme on all 
stakeholders and the national economy.
The policy framework around workers’ 
compensation is too important to be rushed or 
hijacked by a particular interest group. Yet both 
of these criticisms can be levied at the SRC Bill. 
Instead, a bipartisan and balanced approach 
to designing a nationally consistent workers’ 
compensation framework should be adopted. This 
is in the interests of all stakeholders and Australia 
as a whole. 
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